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Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
CLARKE v. DFLAWARE AND HUDSON RIVER RAILWAY CO.
An action in the state courts may be removed into the courts of the United
States, under the Act of Congress of 1867, c. 196, at any time before the final
trial in such action; and a trial before the jury and failure to agree upon a verdict, is not to be regarded as such a final trial.

Tiiis action was tried before a jury in this court and the jury
disagreed. The defendants then filed a motion with the proper
papers to remove the case to the United States Circuit Court under
the Acts of Congress of July 27th 1866, and the amendatory Act
of March 2d 1867. (14 U. S. Statutes, 306 and 558.)
The plaintiff opposed the motion on the ground that it was too
late, as a trial had taken place in the state court.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
POTTER, J.-The Act of 1866 provides for removal of a suit

at any time "before the trial or final hearing." The Act of 1867
varies the language somewhat; and provides for removal at any
time "before the final hearing or trial."
We have been referred to the recent decision of the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts in the case of Galpin v. Oritchlow (ante
p. 137), where the circumstances were similar to those of the case
before us. There had been one trial resulting in a disagreement
of the jury; and that court decided that the cause could not be
removed. We cannot acquiesce in the reasoning or the conclusion
in that case. And we think the weight of argument and authority
is decidedly in favor of the right to remove.
Witl the policy of the Acts of Congress, we as a court. whatever our individual opinions, have nothing to do. Their effect no
doubt is to carry into the United States courts a great mass of
litigation, which would otherwise remain in the state courts.
The Act of 1867 has been decided not to be unconstitutional
by the United States Supreme Court in 1872, in the case of the
(ihieago J, North Western Railuay Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wallace
270. See also Fields v. Lamb, 1 Deady 430.
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Upon the construction of the act we must, however, decide.
This indeed seems to be a, mere form on our part, as in two cases,
Hazard et al. v. Durant.et al., 9 R. I., and .Emls v. Pol)e et al.,
not yet reported, where this court decided there was no ground for
removal, the United States Circuit Court nevertheless took imme,diate jurisdiction of them. See also 0deago ft., Railway Co.
v. Whiten, 25 Wisconsin 274; s. c. in 13 Wallace 270, and
Ackerly v. Vilas, in the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 8 Am. Law
Reg. N. S. 558, and s. c. before MILLER, U. S. District Judge, 8
Am. Law Reg. N. S. 229.
It might be desirable that some mode should be provided by
-whichquestions relating to the construction of these acts, involving
possible conflict of jurisdiction, might even before a trial upon the
merits of a cause be taken to the United States Supreme Court
for their decision. Congress, however, have made no provision
for it. In one case, indeed, where the state court refused the removal and proceeded immediately to trial, the suit was removed
to the United States Supreme Court by writ of error.
Our conclusion is that an order should be entered t~iat this court
will proceed no further in the cause. And we are clearly of
opinion that the amendments made to the declaration should be
considered as made as of the time when the declaration was filed.
But if the cause is to be removed, it should be removed as of the
date when the motion for removal was made. And the papers
should be certified as they were at that date.
The foregoing opinion, taking the opposite view from that maintained by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Mlassachusetts, in Gilpin v. Critddow, ante p. 137,
et seq., will be of interest. We are not
surprised at the result to which the court
came in this case, since it seems to us
to follow the natural import of the
words of the statute, and to be sufficiently in keeping with the general
spirit of congressional legislation, upon
this and kindred subjects, since our unfortunate civil war, not to excite any
surprise. The argument of Chief Justice GRAY in the Massacltsetts case,

conceived, as it is, in themost beautiful
spirit of judicial courtesy, in attempting
to make the provisions of the act conform to a decent and proper respect in
Congress for the fairness and justice of
proceedings in the state courts, does not,
as our note to the case sufficiently intimated, quite come up to the legislative
spirit of Congress upon matters affecting judicial proceedings in the states
lately in rebellion, and we should be
surprised, if the national Supreme Court
did not feel compelled to adopt the construction here put upon the act.
I. F. R.
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Supreme Court of Eror8 of Connecticut.
BALDWIN v. TIE GREENWOODS TURNPIKE COMPANY.
A traveller sustaining an injury by reason of a defect in a highway attributable
to the negligence of the corporation bound to maintain it, is not barred of his
right to recover by reason of the fact that on his own part an accident has contributed to the injury, if it is in no way attributable to his own negligence.
And it does not affect the case that the accident occurred upon another road over
which the defendants had no control.
It is not necessary that ordinary care should have been exercised by the plaintiff at the very time and place of the injury, if such accident has rendered the exercise of such care impracticable.
Tie plaintiff's horse, driven by his servant in his carriage along a public highway, in the exercise of ordinary care, became frightened by the breaking of the
carriage in consequence of a defect for which no negligence was attributable to the
plaintiff, and ran furiously, throwing out the driver, soon after which he left the
highway and passed over private property to and upon a turnpike road, where,
still running furiously, he fell over the side of a bridge by reason of a defect in
tile railing and was injured, such defect being attributable to the negligence of the
turnpike company. Held, that the turnpike company was liable for the injury.
A traveller is not responsible for a secret defect in his carriage or harness, where
there has been no want of ordinary care on his part in relation to it.

CASE, for an injury from a defective bridge of the defendants, a
turnpike company; brought to the Superior Court in Litchfield
county, and tried to the jury on the general issue, before GRANtiER, J.

On the trial it was proved and admitted taat one Hartrick was
driving the horse of the plaintiff on a town road in Norfolk, in a

buggy belonging to the plaintiff, and that while so driving, being
on slightly descending ground, through some secret defect, in relation to which neither the plaintiff nor Hartrick was in fault, the
clip or iron band which attached the end of one of the shafts to the
down axle, broke and let the shaft with the cross-bar of the shafts
upon the horse's heels. The horse kicked and began to run, and
Hartrick in attempting to rein him to one side of the road, was
himself thrown out of the buggy. The horse then, freed from any
control of a driver, ran more swiftly, went around a school-house
standing by the side of the town road, and coming out again upon
the road, ran into a large two-horse lumber-wagon standing near
the road-side. By this collision the other shaft was broken from
the buggy, and the horse, with only the shafts and crossbar attached to him, continued to run furiously down a hill, and ran upon
the defendants' turnpike and upon a bridge of the defendants, over
the side of which he fell and was so injured as to become worthless.
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The horse was on the defendants' road only about thirty feet before
coming to the bridge, and only about fifty feet upon their road at
all. The place where the clip broke was on a town road over which
the defendants had no control, and for which they were not responsible, and was some eighty or ninety rods from the defendants'
road. The place where Hartrick was thrown out was on the town
road, and was some seventy or eighty rods from the defendants'
road. After HIartrick was thrown out the horse was wholly free
from any guidance whatever, and ran in the excited and frightened
manner above described. It was also admitted that when the horse
ran around the school-house as above stated, he went outside of the
limits of any highway.
}Iartrick testified that he could have controlled the horse if lie
had not been thrown out of the buggy. There was other evidence
tending to prove the same thing. There was no evidence whatever
to the contrary.
The plaintiff introduced evidence tending to show, and claimed
that he had proved, that the defendants' bridge was defective for
want of a suitable railing, and that the injury would not have
happened if there had been a sufficient railing on the south side of
the bridge.
Upon these facts the defendants claimed that the plaintiff was
not entitled to recover, because he had not shown that he was in
the exercise of due care at the time the injury happened, and that
from the nature of the circumstances he was precluded from exercising such care, and asked the court in writing to charge the jury
"that in order to entitle the plaintiff to recover, he must show
that he was in the exercise of due care at the time the injury was
received; and that if he did not at the time of the injury exercise
such care, even though prevented by accident from so doing, he
could not recover."
The judge read the first part of this request in his charge, and
stated to the jury that that was the law. He then read the remainder, and said to the jury, "I do not understand tbat the law goes to
this extent. You are to look at all the circumstances under which
Ilartrick was placed at the time, and if you find that lie did all
that a reasonable and prudent man could do, situated as he then
was, it will be in my judgment a sufficient compliance with the rule
of the law as I have stated it to you."
The court also charged the jury that in order to entitle the

BALDWIN v. TURNPIKE CO.

plaintiff to their verdict, they must find that the defendants' bridge
was defective for the want of a sufficient railing, and that the injury to the horse occurred through such want of a railing.
The defendants further requested the court, in writing, to instruct thejury, "that if they should find that the injury complained
of happened to the horse while he was out of the reach and control
of the driver, running at large, wildly, excited by fear, and under
no guidance, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover." The court
did not so instruct the jury, but said to them that this request appeared to be but an amplification of the previous one, upon which
lie had already spoken, and that if they should find that the injury
resulted from the negligence of the defendants in not providing a
suitable railing to their bridge, and that the plaintiff's driver was
doing all that a reasonably careful man could do under the cireunistances of his situation, the simple fact that the horse was free
from the control of the driver at the moment of the injury would
not preclude the plaintiff from a right to their verdict.
The defendants also asked the court to charge the jury, "that
as the efficient procuring cause of the injury happened wholly off
their road and on a town highway, they were not liable; and that
as it appeared that the horse when going around the school-house
went entirely outside the limits of any highway, the defendants
for such reason were not liable." The court did not so instruct
the jury, but charged them that if the injury to the plaintiff's horse
happened, as claimed by him, through the want of a sufficient railing on the defendant' bridge, the fact that the accident, which in
the succession of events was the first cause leading to such injury,
happened outside the limits of the defendants' road, would not
prevent his recovery; nor the circumstance that the horse in running went entirely off the limits of any highway.
The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendants
moved for a new trial for error in the charge of the court and in
the refusal to charge as requested.
q. C. Woodrutff and Andrews, in support of the motion.-1.
The rule is that a plaintiff seeking to recover for an injury arising
friom a defective highway or bridge, must show that he exercised
due care to avoid it: Birge v. Gardner, 19 Conn. 507 ; Meeks v.
Conn. & It.Island Turnpike Co., 20 Id.134; Neal v. Gillet, 23
Id. 437, 444; Pox v. Town of Glastonbury, 29 Id. 204; Angell
on Highways, § 345 ; 1 Hilliard oni Torts, ch. 4, § 5.
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2. This rule requires that care be exercised at the very time
when, and place where, the injury happens: 1 Hilliard on Torts,
ch. 4, § 2; Calkins v. City of Hartford, 33 Conn. 57 ; Thorp v.
Town of Brookfield, 36 Id. 320; Bronson v. Town of Southbury,
37 Id. 199; Congdon v. City of Norwich, Id. 414; Landolt v. City
of Norwich, Id. 615; Hyde v. Jamaica, 27 Yerm. 443; Palmer v.
Andover, 2 Cush. 600; Davis v. Dudley, 4 Allen 557; Blodgett
v. City of Boston, 8 Id. 237 ; Titus v. Northbridge, 97 Mass. 258;
Xoore v. Abbott, 32 Maine 46 ; Parrarv. Greene, Id. 574; M~oulton v. Sanford, 51 Id. 127.
3. The charge finds no support in those cases which decide that
a plaintiff may recover even though an accident contribute to the
injury. All those cases require that due care be exercised at the
very time of the injury: Hunt v. Pownal, 9 Vermn. 411; Clark v.
Barrington, 41 N. H. 44; Winship v. Enfield, 42 Id. 197;
Shearm. & Redf. on Negligence, § 416.
4. The charge given, that the accident happening outside the
limits of the defendants' road did not prevent the plaintiff's right
of recovery, was wrong. It is found that the defendants were not
responsible for the town road: Rowell v. City of Lowell, 7 Gray
100; Kidder v. Dunstable, Id. 104; Richards v. Enfield, 13 Id.
844.
Graves and E. W. Seymour, contra, cited Clark v. Barrington,
41 N. H. 44; Tucker v. H1enricker, Id. 317; Winship v. Enfield,
42 Id. 197; Hunt v. Pownal, 9 Verm. 411; Kelsey v. Glover, 15
Id. 708; Palmer v. Andover, 2 Cush. 600; .11andershied v. Dubuque, 10 Am. Law. Reg. N. S. 526; Angell on Highways, §§
295, 299; Shearm. & Redf. on Negligence, §§ 416 and note, 417.
MINOR, J.-A servant of the plaintiff was driving his horse before a carriage on a public highway in the town of Norfolk, over
which the defendants had no control, and which was then without
defect. While so driving, from some secret defect, and without
fault on the part of the plaintiff or his servant, the iron band attaching the end of one of the shafts to the axle broke, and the shaft,
with the cross-bar, fell upon the horse's heels. The horse, very
much excited and frightened, at once commenced to run, and in a
short time the servant, in efforts to restrain him, was thrown from
the carriage ; after which the horse, with great speed and without
control, ran from the public highway upon private property outside
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of the limits of any highway, and from thence upon the defendants'
turnpike, passing on to the turnpike at a point about thirty feet
distant from one of the defendants' bridges, which they were bound
to keep in repair. The horse, still excited and without control,
continued his course on the turnpike, and on to the bridge, and
having passed about twenty feet thereon, was injured by reason of
filling from the side of the same on account of a defect in the railing, which the defendants had carelessly and negligently failed to
keep in proper repair.
'rie plaintiff's servant was thrown from the carriage, while on
t':, public highway, and at a place about eighty rods distant from
th, turnpike.
There is nothing in the case showing that the horse was vicious
or unfitted to encounter the risks of ordinary public travel, nor
that the plaintiff or his servant was negligent in not knowing of the
secret defect in the carriage, nor that there was any negligence or
want of reasonable care on the part of either, which at all contributed to the injury. But it does appear that the defendants'
negligrence in not keeping the railing of their bridge in proper
repair, combined with an accident for which neither party was
responsible, was the cause of the injury.
Under these circumstances who ought to sustain the loss, the
plaintiff or the defendants ?
The defendants did not seriously urge the secret defect as absolving them from liability, and, as we think, very properly; for a
traleler cannot be regarded as an insurer of the strength of his
carriageP and harness at all times and under all circumstances.
The imost that can be required of him is, that he exercise ordinary
care and prudence with reference to them in their purchase and
use, and in the attention necessarily to be given to them in order
that he may pass safely over highways and bridges not in a defective condition. In this regard it appears that the plaintiff
performed his entire duty.
While essentially admitting this, the defendants claim that the
plaintiff, seeking to recover damages for the injury, must show that
he exercised due care to avoid it at the very tine when, and the
place where, the injury happened; and they deny his right to
recover in this case because by accident he was, then and there,
prevented from exercising any care, and consequently contributed
to his own injury.
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This claim brings into consideration the question, whether the
defendants are relieved from liability for an injury caused by their
negligence, combined with an accident for which no responsibility
attaches to either party.
The plaintiff performed no negligent act, nor can we see that he
failed to do anything by the performance of which the injury might
have been avoided; lie was providentially prevented from acting.
This falls far short of that contributory negligence which excuses
the defendants.
We may conjecture that if the servant had remained with his
horse and continued in control of him, the injury might have been
avoided.
The failure of a traveller to be continually present with his team
up to the time and place of injury, when that failure proceeds from
some cause entirely beyond his control, and not from any regligence on his part, ought not to impose upon him the loss from such
injury, particularly when the direct cause of the same is the negligen.ce of some other party; the loss should be charged upon the party
guilty of the first and only negligence with reference to the matter.
In our judgment the proper rule is this :-If the plaintiff is in
the exercise of ordinary care and prudence, and the injury is attributable to the negligence of the defendants, combined with some
accidental cause, to which the plaintiff has not "negligently contributed, the defendants are liable.
Nor will the fact that the horse of the plaintiff was uncontrolled
for some distance before the injury, change or in any way affect the
liability of the defentants.
The statute laws of our state impose upon towns and corporations
the duty to keep their highways and bridges with sufficient railings
in suitable repair. This is a positive duty, and the safety of the
travelling community requires that it should be rigidly enforced.
When they have been almost criminally remiss in the performance of
this duty, and injuries happen from the insufficiency of their bridges
or highways, they ought not to escape the consequences of such
injuries unless upon the plainest principles of law. While we agree
that the defendants were not bound to provide such railings -for
their bridges as would restrain all uncontrolled or unmanageable
animals passing over the same, we yet hold them to their duty with
reference to sufficient repairs and to their liability 'or injuries occasioned by want of the same.
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The questions arising in this case have been before the courts of
some of our sister states, and the weight of authority seems to be
in favor of the result to which we have come.
In MAaine it has been holden that a town or corporation is not
liable under circumstances similar to those of the present case.
In Massachusetts there have been decisions somewhat conflicting, but the law seems now to be settled that the defendants are
hiolden except when the team becomes' unmanageable outside of the
limits of their highway, or from fright at some object which is not
a defect in the same.
In Vermont the adjudications lead logically to the conclusions
to which we have come. In Hunt v. Pownal, 9 Vermont 411, the
learned Judge REDFIELD, in giving the opinion, says :-" In every
case of damage occurring on the highway, we could suppose a state
of circumstances in which the injury would not have occurred. If
the team had not been too young, or restive; or too old, or too
headstrong, or the harness had not been defective, or the carriage
insufficient, no loss would have intervened. It is against these
constantly occurring accidents that towns are required to guard
in building highways. The traveller is not bound to see to it
that his carriage and harness are always perfect, and his team
of the most manageable character and in the most perfect training,
before he ventures upon the highway. If he could always be sure
of this he would not require any further guaranty of his safety unless the road were absolutely impassable. If the plaintiff is in the
exercise of ordinary care and prudence, and the injury is attributable to the insufficiency of the road conspiring with some accidental cause, the defendants are liable."
The charge of the judge ii the court below was substantially in
accordance with these views. A new trial is therefore not advised.
We have examined this subject so extcnsive.ly, within the last few years,
ante vol. 7, N. S. 785 ; vol. 8, Id. 81,
that we should scarcely be excused for
going into any extended discussion here.
The decision, in the principal case,
seems to us to have adopted the sound
andi sensible view, upon two points, in
regard to which there arc a considerable
number of cases, of high authority, in
direct conflict with the rule here declared.

1. That the defendants are responsible
for an injury happening upon their road,
through their own negligence, or the
defective construction or repair of their
road, and which it was their duty to
remedy, and where such injury would
not have occurred, if the defendants had
done their duty in that respect. In
Davis v. Dudley, 4 Allen 557, it was
decided, that no recovery could be had,
under a state of facts very similar to
those in the principal case. The ground
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there urged, against the recovery, by
the learned judge is, chiefly, that the
plaintiff could not have been in the exercise of proper care at the time the
accident occurred. But that is matter
of fact, in regard to which experienced
persons might differ ; so much so that
it must be regarded a's proper to be submitted to the jury, as it was in the principal case. And the argument, which
has been sometimes urged, in similar
cases, that highways are not required to
be so built, or repaired, as to insure the
safety of runaway teams, is more plausible than sound. No one claims this,
but only that highways shall be kept in
such condition as to be safe for ordinary
travel ; and if damage occurs, through
any deficiency in that respect, even
where, by accident, and without the
fault of the driver or owner, teams have
broken away from immediate control,
the corporation cannot he excused. But,
of course, if the accident was through
the fault of the owner or driver, or the
team broke loose for want of proper
caution or skill, or was not a fit team to
.bring upon the highway, or there was
any other fault of the owner or driver
contributing directly to the damages,
there can be no recovery : Ioward v.
North Bridgwater, 16 Pick. 189.
2. The other point seems equally unquestionable and very nearly connected
with the one just alluded to ; viz. : that
where the damage is the combined result

of accident and the defectiveness of the
highway, there is no reason why a recovery should not be had, provided there
was no fault on the part of the plaintiff
or his servants. This view seems to be
maintained in Palmer Y. Andover, 2
Cush. 600. But some of the late cases
seem to hold that the damages must resuit solely from the defectiveness of the
highway, and that towns or turnpike
companies are not responsible for the
consequences primarily caused or set in
motion by some accidental occurrence:
Moore v. Abbott, .32 Mle. 46 ; Moulton v.
SanIdford, 51 Id. 127, Chief Justice
APPLETOxi dissenting. %%admit, of
course, that if the primary cause of
the damage was some defect in the plaintiff's travelling apparatus, or anything
else for which lie is responsible, and
which he might have guarded against
by the proper degree of care and watchfulness, he cannot recover, because he
was himself in fault, in regard to a
matter directly contributing to the loss:
Rowell v. Lowell, 7 Gray 101. But we
trust the profession and the courts will
finally come to the conclusion, that
travellers are not to be subjected to that
stringency of watchfulness, in regard to
the perfect security of their travelling
equipage, which we require of passenger carriers, before they venture abroad,
or else forfeit all right to demand secure
highways.
I. F. R.

Supreme Court of .Error8of Connecticut.
PERRY v. THE SIMPSON WATERPROOF MANUFACTURING CO.
• Upon a former trial between the same parties the counsel for the defendants, a
corporation, had admitted their incorporation and th at certain persons were officers
of the company at a certain time, and the plaintiff had therefore introduced no
proof upon these points. A second trial was had, previous to which the defendants gave the plaintiff notice that they withdrew their admission of the former
trial. Upon the second trial the plaintiff, having given notice to the defendants to
produce the records of the corporation in court, which they neglected to do, offered
in evidence the admission of their counsel upon the former trial. Held, 1. That
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the admission did not bind the defendants in such a way as to estop them from denying on the second trial the facts admitted on the first. 2. Blut that the admission
was admissible in evidence, with all the circumstances in which it was made, as
tending to prove the facts admitted.

ASSUPSIT for the breach of a covenant of the defendunts, a,
incorporated company, to employ the plaintiff in their service, and
for services rendered under the contract ; brought to the Superior
Court in Fairfield County. A new trial having been granted in
the case (37 Conn. R. 520), it was now tried upon the general
issue, closed to the court, before GRANGER, J.
Upon the trial it was necessary for the plaintiff to show the
legal incorporation of the defendants, and the fact that Simon
Stevens was president, Edwin L. Simpson a director, and Abijah
McEwen the secretary of the corporation, at the time of the making
and breach of the contract, and lie offered the testimony of Messrs.
Seymour and Sanford, his counsel upon the former trial, to prove,
and he did prove thereby, that upon the former trial Messrs. Treat
and Blake, then counsel for the defendants, admitted those facts.
The defendants thereupon offered to prove, and did prove, that the
facts were admitted for the purposes of the former trial, and that
several months before the present term of the court they had given
notice to the plaintiff that the same facts would not be admitted
upon the present trial, but would be denied. But it was proved
on the part of the plaintiff that when notice was so given said
Simpson and MeEwen were both long deceased, and that the company had long ceased business; and that the plaintiff had given
the defendants notice to produce on the present trial their records,
books and files, showing or going to show the facts to be as claimed
by the plaintiff, but that the defendants aid not produce any books,
records, papers or files of the company, and that the plaintiff was
unable to find any of the same, and was unable to procure the testimony of the said Stevens. The plaintiff did however produce
other oral testimony tending to show the facts above mentioned,
and also produced in evidence a copy duly authenticated of a public
record of the certificate of the incorporation of the company, the
company being a New York corporation.
To the testimony offered by the plaintiff with regard to the admissions made on the former trial the defendants objected, but the
court admitted the same, and thereupon rendered judgment for the
plaintiff.
The defendants filed ' motion for a new trial for error in this
.ruling of the court.
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Treat and Bullock, in support of the motion.-The rule here
must be the same as in attempts at settlement of controversies.
An admission of a fact as a fact is admissible. Au admission
for the purposes of a settlement is not admissible: Hlartford
Bridge Company'v. Granger,4 Conn. 148; Fuller v. lamton,
5 Id. 426; Stranahanv. East .Haddarn, 11 Id. 507. In Sanford
v. Clark, 29 Conn. 457, the plaintiff, during the progress and for
the purposes of a trial, acknowledged a debt barred by the statute.
The court held that the admission did not remove the bar, because
the plaintiff in what lie said did not intend to make a new promise.
A letter written by the adverse party, "without prejudice,." is inadmissible: Healey v. Thatcher, 8 Car. & P. 388. An admission
made conditionally is not admissible under different circumstances :
2 Stark. Ev. 27. Nor the admission of an attorney on one trial
at a subsequent trial: WVeisbrod v. Chicago ft. B. B. Co., 20
Wis. 419. The reason given is that it is evident ihe admission
was made only for the first trial. The Superior Court seems to
have overlooked the distinction between qualified and unqualified,
limited and unlimited admissions. Admissions in thb course of a
trial often save time and expense, and ouglht to be encouraged and
limited to the purpose for which they were made. Suppose on the
first trial a statement of the testimony of an absent witness had
been made by the plaintiff, admitted by the defendant, and read in
evidence, would either party be bound by it on another trial?
Clearly not, because manifestly made by one party and admitted
by the other solely for the purposes of that trial, although not'so
expressed, as in the case before the court. When a new trial is
granted a case is as if it had never been tried. A new trial means
a new trial, not a repetition of the old one. Neither party would
be restricted to the former evidence, or to the same line of attack
or defence. The reasons for a new trial may, and almost always
do, materially change the position" of the parties. In Bewort v.
Loomer, 21 Conn. 245, it was holden that an attorney could not
compromise a case. See-also cases there cited. Certainly then an
admission by an attorney ought not to be construed to the prejudice of a client. Suppose a client had discharged his attorneys on
account of their ignorance or incompetency, manifested by unnecessary admissions injurious to him on the first trial. We submit
that no well considered case can be found where oral admissions
made in the progress and for the purposes of a trial have been
holden admissible on another trial.
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,S'anford, contrd, cited Elton v. Larkins, 5 Car. & P. 385;
Wetherell v. Bird, 7 Id. 6; Goldie v. Shuttleworth, 1 Campb. 70;
1o'ung Y.
d5ight, Id. 139; .Milward v. Temple, Id. 375; Langley v. Lord Oxford, 1 Mees. & Wels. 508; Cook v. Barr, 4 N.
York 156; Chamberlin v. Preble, 11 Allen 370; 1 Greenl. Ev.,
§§ 27, 186, 205, 207; 1 Phill. Ev. 105; 2 Steph. N. P. 1626;
Bigelow on Estoppel 10.
FOSTER, J.-We are quite prepared to give our assent to the
doctrine insisted on by the defendants' counsel, at least so far forth
as to hold that the admission of a fact, made on and for the purposes of one trial, does not bind the party thus making it, so as to
prevent him from disputing the truth of that fact, at another trial.
This however is not the question, certainly not the whole question,
presented by this motion.
On the trial of this case it appears that it became necessary to
prove the incorporation of the defendants, their existence, and that
certain persons were officers of the corporation at a time specified
in the declaration. To prove these facts the plaintiff offered evidence that, at a former trial, the defendants' counsel admitted
them to be true. To the admission of this testimony the defendants objected, and offered proof that said facts were admitted for
the purposes of the former trial, and that the plaintiff previously
to the present trial had notice that the same would not again be
admitted, but would be denied.
The court admitted the testimony, and we think correctly.
What occurred at a former trial, so far as it throws light on the
questions involved in the pending issue, made up and to be decided
between the same parties, must be admissible in evidence. General
rules regulating the admissibility 6f evidence require it. If at a
former trial certain facts were admitted as true which it becomes
important to prove in a subsequent trial, that such admission was
made may be proved as a fact. Admissions by a party, or by an
authorized agent, either in a court or out, may be given in evidence.
But the circumstances surrounding the admission, the purposes for
which it was made, and the conditions attached to it, may be fully
shown. It may not infrequently happen that a party will not be
bound by an admission, and will not be estopped from denying its
truth. And in view of the showing on both sides, allowing each
party to prove the whole truth, it will be for the triers to deterVOL. XXII.-29
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mine how tho proof stands on the facts in controversy, on which
the admission is claimed to bear.
These principles were acted on, subsequently, in the court below.
They seem to us just and reasonable, and in harmony with the law
of evidence.
A new trial is not advised.
In this opinion
concurred.
- PARK,

SEYMOUR, C. J., CARPENTER and PHELPS, JJ.,

J., was of opinion that, inasmuch as it is found as a fact

in the case, that the counsel for the defendants on the former trial
expressly limited their admissions to the purposes of that trial,
and so informed the counsel for the plaintiff at the time the admissions were made, thus making the limitation a part of the admissions themselves, they could not be regarded on the second trial, and
that the evidence should have been excluded.
The decision in the foregoing case is
one of practical importance, and if entirely sound will operate to hinder the
making of such admissions, in future,
for the purpose of a particular trial, since
counsel world hesitate about making
such admissions,,if the fact of having
made them at one trial might be given
in evidence upon a future trial, after the
agreement had been revoked or had expired by its own limitation, as proof or
testimony tending to prove that the facts
embraced in such formal admission were
true for all purposes and to all tirie in
the particular cause.
The whole proceeding seems to us too
loose for practical purposes, and, at the
same time, based upon a misconception
of the law, and the most approved practice, upon the subject.
1. Such an admission, made, either
generally in the particular action, or for
the purposes of a particular trial, should
always be in writing, signed by the
counsel upon both sides, or, at the least,
entered upon the minutes of the trial,
by the presiding judge, and with the
understanding and assent of both counsel,
to the very terms of the admission,

ipsissima vsrba. Nothing of this kind
appears to have been done in this case.
The admission, when merely oral, should
always be regarded as funclus officio,
after the particular trial terminates ; for
no judge, who consults the decorum of
his court, will ever consent to arbitrate
between counsel, either as to the terms,
or the effect, of their oral agreements.
Unless the counsel agree, at the trial,
as to the oral agreements made between
them, concerning the trial, the court cannot regard them, in any sense, unless
as a ground for postponing the trial.
2. If tlhe agreement between counsel
for the adnission of certain facts, at the
trial, be properly reduced to writing and
filed in the cause, its force and operation
must depend upon the intention of the
parties making it; or, in other words,
the fair import and construction of its
terms, with reference to the subjectmatter. A general agreement to admit
certain facts, for the purpose of the trial
of a cause, might naturally be construed
to embrace all the trials of the action ;
and such admissions admit of no contradiction. As Mr. Greenleaf states it:
"They are in general conclusive, anti
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may be given in evidence even upon a
new trial ;" citing Doe v. Bird, 7 0.
& P. 61 ; Longleg v. Ld. Oxford, I M.
& W. 508. But, after this admission
has performed its office, it becomes of
no force, whatever, for any purpose. It
ii then no more than the conversations
of counsel about the cause, and not evidence at all. Counsel have no general
authority to bind their clients by general admissions about the cause, since
they do not represent their clients in
any such capacity. But in the other capacity, of framing the issue, and arranging what facts shall be conceded,
and what provdd, at the trial, they do
represent them most directly and em-
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phatically. The learned commentator
on evidence lays this down very clearly
in the section just referred to, citing
Young v. lflright, I Camp. 139, 141, and
many other cases. We should therefore
entertain no question, that the dissenting judge, the present learned Chief Justice PARK, of that court, was entirely
in the right in holding " that the evidence should have been rejected."
But the opinion of such a court is
entitled to more weight than anything
we could claim on behalf of our own
views, and may very probably be correct,
upon some ground which does not occur
to us in our unassisted and brief examiI. F. R.
nation.

Supreme Court of the United States.
Ex

PARTE

JAMES S. ROBINSON.

The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders and writs of the courts, and consequently to the
due administration of justice. The moment the courts of the United States were
called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they became
possessed of this power.
The Act of Congress of March 2d 1831, entitled, "an act declaratory of the
law concerning contempts of court," limits the power of the Circuit and District
Courts of the United States to three classes of cases : Ist, where there has been
misbehavior of a person in the presence of the courts, or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice ; 2d, where there has been misbehavior of
any officer of the courts in his official transactions ; and, 3d, where there has
been disobedience or resistance by any officer, party, juror, witness or other
person, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree or command of the courts.
The 17th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, in prescribing fine or imprisonment as the punishment which may be inflicted by the courts of the United States
for contempts, operates as a limitation upon the manner in which their power in
this respect may be exercised, and is a negation of all other modes of punishment.
The power to disbar an attorney is possessed by all courts which have antlority to admit attorneys to practice. But the power can only be exercised where
there has been such conduct on the part of the party complained of as shows him
to be unfit to be a member of the profession ; and before judgment disbarring him
can be rendered lie should have notice of the grounds of complaint against him
and ample opportunity of explanation and defence.
Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to restore an attorney disbarred where the
court below has exceeded its jurisdiction in the matter.

Ex PARTE ROBINSON.

PETITION for mandamus to the judge of the District Court of
the United States for the Western District of Arkansas.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-On the 16th day of July 1873, the grand jury of
the western district of Arkansas reported to the District Court of
the United States for the district, then in session at Fort Smith,
,hat they had made every effort in their power to have a witness
by the name of Stephenson summoned to appear before them;
that for this purpose a subpoena for the witness bad been placed
the day previous in the bands of a deputy marshal by the name
of Sheldon, for service; that the deputy marshal, on the same
day, went to the town of Van Buren, as he said, to make the
service ; that after he had left the witness was seen on the streets
at Fort Smith, and the subyena was on that morning returned
unserved; that they had learned from evidence before them that
the witness knew that a subpena was issued for him, and had for
that reason come to Fort Smith, "but," continues the report,
"after seeing the attorney, J. S. Robinson, in the Nash case, very
suddenly absented himself." The jury, therefore, prayed the
court to issue an order that the witness, Stephenson, be brought
before them.
Upon this report, without other complaint, the court ordered
that Sheldon, th deputy marshal, Stephenson, the witness, and
Robinson, the attorney, "show cause why they should not be
punished as for a contempt."
Two days afterwards, on the 18th of July, the petitioner filed
the response of the deputy marshal to the order. The judge then
reminded the petitioner that there was also a rule against him, to
which he replied: "Yes, sir ; I know it and I am here to respond.
I don't know what there is for me to answer. It," referring to
the report of the grand jury, "says I saw Silas R. Stephenson.
I do not know what the grand jury has to do with my private
business in my law office," and was proceeding to reflect upon the
action of the grand jury, when the judge said: "You must answer
in writing, Mr. Robinson;" to which the petitioner replied, "the
rule itself does not require me to respond in writing." Upon
this the judge said, turning to the clerk, "it should have done so ;
you will amend the order if it does not, Mr. Clerk." The petitioner
declined to answer the rule until it was amended. The judge then
FIELD,
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said: "Well, I will make the order for you to respond in writing
now. Mr. Clerk, you will enter an order requiring Mr. Robinson
to answer the rule in writing." Upon which the petitioner said,
"I shall answer nothing;" and thereupon immediately, without
time for another word, the judge ordered the clerk to strike the
petitioner's name from the roll of attorneys, and the marshal to
remove him from the bar.
This account of the language used by the petitioner and the
judge is taken from the latter's response to the alternative writ
issued by this court. Thejudge states at the same time that the tone
and manner of the petitioner were angry, disrespectful and defiant;
and that regarding the words "I shall answer nothing," and the
tone in which they were uttered as in themselves grossly and intentionally disrespectful, as an expression of an intention to disobey
and treat with contempt an order of the court, and believing that
the petitioner intended to intimidate him in the discharge of his
duties, he felt it due to himself and his office to inflict summary
and severe punishment upon the petitioner.
The order of the court disbarring the petitioner, made at the
time, and entered in the minutes of the court kept by the clerk,
was declared by the judge to be erroneous in form, and afterwards,
on the 28th of July, a more formal order was entered nune pro
tunc. This latter order recites the report of the grand jury
mentioned above, the rule to show cause issued thereon why the
parties should not be punished as for a contempt, amended from
the original order by the insertion of the words, "forthwith in
writing and under oath :" and that the petitioner having notice
at the time that he was required to respond to the rule, "in a
grossly contemptuous, contumacious and defiant manner," in open
court, refused to respond in writing; and then proceeds to decree
that, for his contempt committed in open court, as well as for his
contempt committed in refusing to respond to the rule, the license
of the petitioner as an attorney and counsellor-at-law and solicitor
in chancery be vacated; that the petitioner be disbarred from
further practice in the court, and that his name be stricken from
the roll of attorneys, counsellors and solicitors of the court.
Before this amended order was entered the petitioner, through
counsel, filed a motion to vacate the judgment disbarring him upon
various grounds, which were specified. After its entry a motion
to set aside the order as amended was made, in which the petitioner
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adopted the grounds of the original motion and added others.
The substance of the more important of these was, that no charges
had been previously preferred in writing and filed against him;
that he had had no notice of any charges; that the report of the
grand jury contained no charge which he could be required to
-answer; that no rule bad been served upon him to show cause
why lie should not be disbarred; that he had had no trial previous
thereto, and had been denied the right of being heard in his
defence; and that the court had no jurisdiction under the circumstances to render the judgment disbarring him.
The petitioner also set up among the grounds upon which lie
would rely, that the sentence he uttered, "I shall answer nothing,"
was incomplete, and that he was prevented from finishing it by the
action of the judge in interrupting him with the judgment disbarring him; that the sentence completed would have been, "I shall
answer nothing until the order to answer the rule in writing shall
be served upon me."
The petitioner also disclaimed any intention to commit a contempt of the court, or to act in defiance of its orders or authority
at the time, and averred that he was not conscious of the conduct
attributed to him towards the court. This statement was verified
by his oath; but the motion was denied.
The petitioner now asks from this court for a mandamus upon
the judge to vacate the order disbarring him and to restore him to
the roll of attorneys and counsellors. In his petition, which is
verified, he refers to the proceedings of the court below, there cord
of which he produces, and states that in the interview which the
grand jury mentioned there was no allusion made to the Nash case
or to the grand jury, and that the consultation related to a totally
different matter.
The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts ; its
existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of thejudgments, orders and writs
of the courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice.
The moment the courts of the United States were called into existence
and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of this power. But the power has been limited and defined
by the Act of Congres*s of March 2d 1831, 4 Stat. at Large 487.
The act, in terms, applies to all courts; whether it can be held to
limil the authority of the Supreme Court, which derives its existence
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and powers from the Constitution, may perhaps be a matter of
doubt. But that it applies to the circuit and district courts there
can be no question. These courts were created by Act of Congress. Their powers and duties depend upon the act calling them
into existence, or subsequent acts extending or limiting their jurisdiction. The Act of 1831 is, therefore, to them the law specifying
the cases in which summary punishment for contempts may be inflicted. It limits the power of these courts in this respect to three
classes of cases: 1st, where there has been misbehavior of a person
in the presence of the courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the
alministration of justice; 2d, where there has been misbehavior of
any officer of the courts in his official transactions; and, 3d where
there has been disobedience or resistance by any officer, party, juror,
witness or other person, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree or command of the courts. As thus seen, the power of these
courts in the punishments of contempts can only be exercised to
insure order and decorum in their presence, to secure faithfulness
on the part of their officers in their official transactions, and to enforce obedience to their lawful orders, judgments and processes.
If we now test the report of the grand jury by this statute, we
find nothing in it which justified any proceeding whatever as for a
contempt on the part of the court below against Robinson. No
act of his is mentioned which could constitute within the statute a
contempt either of the court or of its judge. The allegation that
the witness Stephenson, after seeing Robinson, had suddenly absented himself, amounted to nothing more than an insinuation that
possibly he may have been advised to that course by Robinson.
There was no averment of any fact which the court could notice or
the attorney was bound to explain.
Whatever contempt was committed by the petitioner consisted
in the tone and manner in which his language to the court was
uttered. On this hearing we are bound to take the statements in
that respect of the judge embodied in his order as true, for the
question before us is not whether the court erred, but whether it
had any jurisdiction to disbar the petitioner for the alleged contempt.
The law happily prescribes the punishment which the court can
impose for contempts. The 17th section of the Judiciary Act of
1789 declares that the court shall have power to punish contempts
of their authority in any cause or hearing before them. by fine or
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imprisonment, at their discretion. The enactment is a limitation
upon the manner in which the power shall be exercised, and must
be held to be a negation of all other modes of punishment. The
judgment of the court disbarring the petitioner, treated as a punishment for a contempt, was, therefore, unauthorized and void.
The power to disbar an attorney proceeds upon very different
grounds. This power is possessed by all courts which have authority to admit attorneys to practice. But the power can only be exercised where there has been such conduct on the part of the parties complained of as shows them to be unfit to be members of the
profession. Parties are admitted to the profession only upon satisfactory evidence that they possess fair private character and sufficient legal learning to conduct causes in court for suitors. The
order of admission is the judgment of the court that they possess
the requisite qualifications both in character and learning. They
become by such admission officers of the court, and, as is said in -Ex
parte Garland,4 Wall. 878, "they hold their office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained
and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be
heard has been afforded." Before a judgment disbarring an attorney is rendered he should have notice of the grounds of complaint
against him and ample opportunity of explanation and defence.
This is a rule of natural justice, and is as applicable to proceedings
taken to deprive an attorney of his right to practise his profession,
as it is to proceedings taken to reach his property. And such has
been the general, if not the uniform, practice of the courts of this
country and of England. There may be cases undoubtedly of
such gross and outrageous conduct in open court on the part of
thb attorney, as to justify very summary proceedings for his suspension or removal from office; but even then he should be heard
before he is condemned: Ex parte Ileyfron, 7 How. (Miss.) 127;
People v. Turner, 1 Cal. 148 ; Fletcher v. Dangerfield, 20 Id.
480 ; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 157 ; .Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wallace
834; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Id. 354. The principle that there
must be citation before hearing, and hearing or opportunity of
being heard before judgment, is essential to the security of all
private rights. Without its observance no one would be safe from
oppression wherever power may be lodged.
That mandamus is the appropriate remedy in a case like this to
restore an attorney disbarred, where the court below has exceeded
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it-; jurisdiction in the matter, was decided in Ex parte Bradley, 7
Wallace 364. It would serve no useful purpose to repeat the reasons by which this conclusion was reached, as they are fully and
clearly stated in that case, and are entirely satisfactory.
A peremptory mandamus must issue, requiring the judge of the
court below to vacate the order disbarring the petitioner, and to
restore him to his office; and it is so ordered.
MILLErt,

J., dissented.

Court of .rrors and Appeals of New Jersey.
MAYOR AND COMMON COUNCIL OF NEWARK v. TIE STATE,
AGENS ET AL., PROSECUTORS.
A statute authorizing the expense of paving the road-bed of a city street to be
assessed in the proportion of two-thirds on the property abutting on the street
anti
the remaining third on the public at large, is unconstitutional.
Assessments for local improvements of this character moy be made against the
property peculiarly benefited, but such assessment must be made to the extent only
of such peculiar benefits.
This rule does not apply to improvements of the sidewalk, which is to be regarded as subservient to the premises to which it is attached and the expense of
improving which may be charged wholly to the owner.
A statute directing a municipal corporation to have a street paved at the expense
of the property-owners, and thereafter to keep itin repair at the expense of the
vity, ii not a contract with the property-owners, and the legislature may direct a
repaving at their expense.

TiE 7th section of the Charter of Newark (Pamphlet Laws 1849,
pp. 206, 207) provides "that it shall be lawful for the Common
Council, on the application of three-fourths of the owners of property in any street, to order the said street or section of the street
to be graded, gravelled, paved, flagged or planked, either in whole
or in part, in such manner as they shall deem most advisable,"
&c., "and that after the said grading, gravelling, paving, &c., is
once effected, then the city shall take charge of and keep the same
in repair without further assessment." Acts 1849, pp. 206, 207.
A section of Broad street between Market street and the Morris
Canal was originally paved under the foregoing provision ; and had
been now repaved by virtue of the following section in the suppletnent to the charter passed 18th March 1868, p. 411, viz.: "That
when more than one-half of the owners of the frontage on the line
of any street or section thereof which is now paved, shall apply to
have such street or section repaved, it maybe lawful for the Com-

MAYOR, &c., OF NEWARK v. STATE.

mon Council to order and cause the repaving thereof, and they
shall assess upon the owners of the lots fronting upon the line of
such streets or sections thereof, two-thirds of the costs and expenses
of such repaving, and the city treasury shall bear the remaining one-third; and the city shall be entitled to all the old material, and said assessment to be made in all respects as was required by the Act to which this is a supplement and the supplements
thereto in cases -of the original paving of streets."
Thomas N. McCarter,for plaintiff in error.
Francis, City Counsel, and Cortlandt Parker, for defendant
in error.-The original paving of the street at the expense of the
owners was not a contract which the state could make with them:
Cooley Coast. Lim. 282; 2 Greenl. Cruise 67; 1 Redfield on
Railways (3d ed.) 258. The authorizing, making and imposing
of the assessment in question was a lawful exercise of the taxing
power, and not of eminent domain : Cooley Const. Lim. 496; Williams v. Mayor of Detroit, 2 Mich. 560; 81 New York 588;
State, Sigler, pros., v. Fuller, 5 Vroom 287; People v. City of
Brooklyn, 4 Comst. 480; Sedgwick's Stat. and Corist. Law 502;
Hammett v. Philadelphia,8 Am. Law Reg. 411; Com. v. Woods,
8 Wright 113 ; Mhagee v. om., 10 Id. 859 ; State v. Newark, 3
Dutch. 192; State v. Jersey City, 4 Dutch. 206; State v. .New
Brunswick, 1 Vroom 387; Dillon on Municipal Corp. 694; Gordon v. Carnes, 47 N. Y. 614; Broadway Baptist Ch. v. IcAtee,
8 Bush 512. It rests within the discretion of the legislature to
declare the principle and apportionment of all assessments : Enery
v. San Francisco Gas Co., 28 Cal. 346; Garrett v. St. Louis, 25
Mfo. 508. The legislature may delegate the power of taxation to
municipal corporations: Dillon on Mun. Cor. 687 (n. 21 and cases
cited); Gault'sApp., 9 Casey 100; 6 Whart. 44; State v. Dean, 3
Zab. 885 ; Hand v. Elizabeth, 2 Vroom 47 ; Cooley Con. Lim. 190.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BEASLEY, Chief Justice.-Th'e writ in this case has brought before the court the proceedings in the assessment of the expenses
incurred in repaving the road-bed of a portion of one of the public
streets in the city of Newark. The cost of this work has been imposed in accordance with the directions of the legislative act authorizing these improvements, in the proportion of two-thirds of
such Cost on the owners of the lots fronting on the line of the see-
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tion of the street thus repaved and the remaining third on the city
treasury. It thus appears that the statute in (ucstiofl undertakes
to fix at the mere will of the legislator the ratio of expense to be
put upon the owner of the property along the line of the improvement; and the question is whether such an act is valid.
The inquiry thus involved has of late been so exhaustively discussed in a crowd of judicial decisions, that I do not feel inclined
to do more than to so far refer to general principles as may be necessary to explain clearly what I conceive to have been heretofore
decidetl by this court.
The doctrine that it is competent for the legislature to direct the
expense of opening, paving or improving a public street, or at least
some part of such expense, to be put as a special burthen on the
property in the neighborhood o fsuch improvement, cannot, at this
day, be drawn in question. There is nothing in the Constitution
of this state that requires that all the property in the state, or in
any particular subdivision of the state, must be embraced in the
operation of every law laying a tax. That the effect of such laws
may not extend beyond certain prescribed limits is perfectly indisputable. It is upon this principle that taxes raised in counties,
townships and cities are vindicable. But while it is thus clear
that the burthen of a particular tax may be placed exclusively
upon any political district to whose benefit such tax is to enure, it
seems to me it is equally clear that when such burthen is sought to
be imposed on particular lands not in themselves constituting a
political subdivision of the state, that we at once approach the line
which is the boundary between acts of taxation and acts of confiscation. I think it is impossible to assert with the least show of
reason that the legislative right to select the subject of taxation is
not a limited right. For it would seem much more in accordance
with correct theory to maintain that the power of selection of the
property to be taxed cannot be contracted to narrower bounds than
the political district within which it is to operate, than that such
power is entirely illimitable. If such prerogative has no trammel
or circumscription then it follows that the entire burthen of one
of these public improvements can be placed, by the force of the
legislative will, on the property of a few enumerated citizens, or
even on that of a single citizen. In a government in which the
legislative pdwer is not omnipotent, and in which it is a fundamental axiom that private property cannot be takeri without just
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compensation, the existence of an unlimited right in the law-making power to concentrate the burthen of a tax upon .pecified pro)erty does not exist. If a statute should direct a certain street in
a city to be paved and the expense of such paving to be assessed

on the houses standing at the four corners of such street, this
would not be an act of taxation, and it is presumed that no one
would assert it to be such. If this cannot be maintained, then it
follows that it is conceded that the legislative power in question is
not completely arbitrary. It has its limit, and the only inquiry is
where that limit is to be placed.
This question was considered, and as it was supposed was definitely settled, by this court in the case of Tidewater Company v.
Costar, 3 C. E. Green 519. The principle sanctioned by that decision was that the cost of a public improvement might be imposed
on particularized property to the extent to which such property
was exceptionally benefited: and that any special burthen beyond
that measure was illegal. It was upon this principle that the case
was rested. The rule thus adopted stands upon the idea that it
establishes a standard by which with at least an approach to precision an act of taxation may be distinguished from an act of confiscation.
So far as the particularized property is specially benefited, an
exaction to that extent will not be a condemnation of property to
the public use, because an equivalent is returned; and this is the
ground on which the abnormal burthen put upon the landowner
is justified. Speaking on this subject, Chief Justice GRutEN says:
"The theory upon which such assessments are sustained as a legitimate exercise of the taxing power is, that the party assessed is
locally and peculiarly benefited over and above the ordinary benefit which as one of the community he receives in all public improvements, to the precise extent of the assessment:" State v.

Newark, 8 Dutch. 190. It follows that these local assessments are,
justifiable on the ground alone, that the locality is especially to be
benefited by the outlay of the money to be raised. Unless this is
the ease, no reason can be assigned why the tax is not general.
An assessment laid on property along a city street for an improvement made in another street in a distant part of the same city,
would be universally condemned both on moral and legal grounds.
And yet there is no difference between such an extortion and the
requisition upon a landowner to pay for a public improvement over
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and above the exceptional benefit received by him. It is true that
the power of taxing is one of the high and indi.pensable prerogatives
of the government, and it can be only in cases free from all doubt,
that its exercise can be declared by the courts to be illegal. But
such a case, if it can ever arise, is certainly presented when property
is specified out of which a public improvement is to be paid .for in
excess of the value specially imparted to it by such improvement.
As to such excess I cannot distinguish an act exacting its payment from the exercise of the power of eminent domain. In case
of taxation the citizen pays his quota of the common burthen;
when his land is sequestered for the public use, he contributes
more than such quota; and this is the distinction between the
effect of the exercise of the taxing power and that of eminent
domain.
When then the overplus beyond benefits from these local improvements is laid upon a few landowners, such citizens, with respect to such overplus, are required to defray more than their share
of the public outlay, and the coercive act is not within the proper
scope of the power to tax. And as it does not seem practicable to
define the area upon which a tax can be legitimately laid, and beyond which it cannot be legitimately extended, and as there is, as
has been shown, necessarily a limit to the power of selection in
such instances, the principle stated in the case cited is perhaps the
only one that can be devised whereby to graduate the power.
Consequently when the improvement, as in the present instance, is
primarily for the public welfare, and is only incidentally for the
benefit of the landowner, the rule thus established ought to be
rigidly applied and adhered to.
With the doctrine thus expounded, the case of the State v.
Fuller, 5 Yroom 227, is not in conflict. This was an assessment for the improvement of a sidewalk, and in that feature
differed from the present one, which is for the improvement of the
road bed; I think the difference is a substantial one. A sidewalk
has always in the laws and usages of this state been regarded as
an appendage to and a part of the premises to which it is attached,
and is so essential to the beneficial use of such premises that its
improvement may well be regarded as a burthen belonging to the
ownership of the land, and the order or requisition for such improvement as a police regulation. On this ground I conceive it to
be quite legitimate to direct it to be put in order at the sole ex-
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pense of the owner of the property to which it is subservient and
indispensable.
But in the reported case there was another circumstance which
illegalized the proceedings. A part of the expense of constructing
the sidewalk on one side of the street was thrown on the owners
of the other side of the same street. The portion of the burthen
..thus transferred was one-sixth of the expense, and it was directed
to that extent to be imposed, irrespective of the amount of any
ascertained benefits conferred. This brought the case within the
prohibition inherent in the rule laid down in the Tidewater ja8e,
so that the proceedings should have been set aside. The suggestion that in this class of case it will be presumed that the benefits
equal the burthen imposed until the contrary is shown cannot prevail. If well founded it would have led to a different result in
the Tidewater Case. The only safe rule is, that the statute authorizing the assessment shall itself fix, either in terms or by fair
implication, the legal standard to which such assessment must be
made to conform. In no other way can property be adequately
protected.
The other objections raised by the counsel of the plaintiff in
error djo not seem to me well founded. I can perceive no solid
foundation for the position that the law under which the assessment in question has been made raises up a contract between the
landowner and the public.
This statute declares that it shall be lawful for the common
council, on the application of three-fourths of the owners of property in any street, to order, &c., and it then adds, "That after
such grading, &c., is effected, then the city shall take charge of and
keep the same in repair without further assessment." The argument was that after the landowners had petitioned and the work
was done a bargain was constituted, the essential stipulation of
which is that the expense of keeping the street in order shall be
borne by the public. But how is this language to be converted
into that of contract ? It is not so in form for it makes no offer
to the landowner. Nor is the substance With which it deals the
subject-matter of agreement. It does not purport to ask from the
citizen anything which the state has not the right to demand.
The purpose is to define the mode and the extent of the legislative
power of th; municipality. The power conceded might have been
given in an unqualified form, but its exercise was restricted with
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the condition that it should not be used unless a certain proportion of the owners of property consented, and that the power
should not be used a second time.
IBut these limitations on the prerogative of local legislation are
concessions to the citizen, and cannot with any show of reason be
transformed into'considerations moving from the citizen to the state
on which a contract can be built up. The admission of such a
doctrine would carry many mischiefs with it. Agreements could
be inferred from a large number of the ordinary acts of legislation. Public roads are laid upon the application of a certain number of freeholders, and the statute directs that after such roads are
laid they shall be opened and maintained at the public expense.
Why under such circumstances cannot a contract be claimed as
well as in the case now in hand ? Numerous other examples of
laws from which by the same course of reasoning contracts might
be deduced will readily occur if the mind is given to the subject.
Neither do the decisions which were cited lend, as it appears to
me,the least countenance to the doctrine in question. These are
all cases outside of the ordinary field of legislation, and in which the
citizen was induced to do some act, or yield up some right or property which could not be taken from him except by his voluntary
cession. The true principle undoubtedly is that when it is alleged
that any part of the sovereign power has been parted with by force
of an agreement, such agreement must be clearly manifested. The
cases are largely collected in the excellent work of Chief Justice
COOLEY on Constitutional Limitations 280. The language of the
present statute has not such an aspect, and the intendment that it
was the intention to give up for ever any part of the public control with respect of the mode of keeping in order the streets of a
great city, is not to be entertained for an instant.
This exception to the proceedings cannot be sustained.
On the other points raised on the argument I agree with the
views expressed in the Supreme Court. There are other legal
difficulties in the mode of making assessments under the statutory
provisions above criticised, which were not started on the argument, which I shall not further notice than to intimate that I am
not to be understood as sanctioning them by my silence.
On the ground above stated the judgment is reversed.
DALRIMPLE, J., dissented.
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Where a contract to ship goods at a certain rate per lb. or at the current rates
of the day, did not specify in what the rates were to be computed, evidence of a
custnm to compute them in gold is admissible.
Custom may also be given in evidence to show that certain sums for primage or
av'erage were to be added to the rates expressed.
Such custom being provable in an action on the contract there is no ground for
the jurisdiction of a court of equity.

Walter L. Livingston, for plaintiff.
Lewis Sanders, for defendant.
JOSEPH F. DALY, J.-Upon examination of the case and authorities I am fully convinced that, although the plaintiff has a
cause of action at law, and the evidence produced by him entitles
him to submit his claim to a jury, yet he has no standing in a
court of equity, and his complaint must be dismissed. The ground
of equitable cognisance was the assumed necessity of reforming
the contracts between him and the defendant before he could recover at law upon them. The contracts were that the defendant
would ship by the plaintiff certain boxes of bacon, some at - of a
cent per pound, and some at current rates of the day.
Nothing was said between the parties when the contracts were
made, or before or after they were made, as to whether the rate
was to be computed in gold or paper currency, or whether any
sum for primage or average was to be added to the rate expressed.
The plaintiffs claim and the defendant admits that a usage or
custom well known to the defendant existed in this city where the
contracts were made at the time of. making the contracts and long
before in relation to such contracts, that the rate of freight was to
be computed in gold coin, and that five per cent. for primage and
average was to be added to the freight.
The plaintiff claims that the parties contracted with reference
to such custom intending to incorporate in the contracts the additions as to primage and average, and the distinction as to currency
above mentioned. The defendant denies such intention.
It appears from the cases that the aid of a court of equity in
reforming the contract is not necessary to give plaintiff the benefit
of thie .ustom or usage admitted in the pleadings, because it ap-
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pears that the contract was silent on those points covered by such
usage; that the contracting parties said nothing about them
before or at the time of making the contracts; that the usage
does not vary or contradict terms of the contract, but superadds
other terms which, by custom, they had in view when making it,
and intended should be a part of it. On a trial at law they would
have been permitted to prove the custom or usage. Custom is
Jaw established by long usage; common custom is common law:
Wilcox v. Wood, 9 Wend. 349.
In that case proof of usage was admitted to show that a lease
"from the 1st of May in one year, to the 1st of May in the succeeding year" expired at noon of the last-named day. It has
been held that usage is admissible to show that the terms "day"
in a contract to pay workmen "twelve shillings per day," meant
ten hours: Hinton v. Locke, 5 Uill 438. It was held proper to
show a usage (on sales of indigo where the usual tare allowed was
10 per cent.), that if the indigo were fraudulently packed the
actual tare (in that case 17 per cent.) should be allowed and not
the usual tare of 10 per cent. : Sewell v. Gibbs, 1 Hall Supr. Ct.
R. 602. Proof of usage was admitted between landlord and
tenant, to show right of tenant to remove buildings erected by him
on the demised premises. It was said that every demise between
landlord and tenant in respect to matters in which the parties are
silent, may be fairly open to explanation by the general usage and
custom of the country or district where the land lies ; every person under such circumstances is supposed conusant of the custom
and to contract with a tacit reference to it: Tran Ness v. Packard, 2 Peters 148. Proof of usage was admitted to show measure
of compensation and how it was to be paid to a public officer,
beyond his stated compensation: United States v. .illebrown, 7
Peters 50. Custom was admitted to show how measurement of
plaster to be paid for by the square yard was to be made, whether
door and window spaces on the wall were to be included or excluded: Walls v. .Baily/, 49 N. Y. 464.
In the early case of Wigglesworth v. Dallson, 1 Smith Lead.
Cases 800, proof of local custom was admitted (against the general
rule of law concerning emblements), that tenant by deed should
have way-going crops after expiration of his term. In Smith v.
Wilson, 3 Barn. & Adol. 728, local usage was admitted to show
that in a particular locality in computing the number of r'abbits,
VoL. XXI.-30
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the term " 1000" rabbits denoted 1200. And this on the ground,
that there was no statute denoting that 1000 should mean ten
hundred, and the term was used by the parties with reference to
the custom of the place where the contract was made, (Lord TENTERDEN, LITTLEDALE, TAUNTON and PARK, JJ.) In Brown v.
Byrne, 3 E. & B. 703, proof of custom was admitted to show
that three months' discount was to be deducted from freights payable under bills of lading coming from certain ports, and it was
held that the custom controlled the bill of lading, expressing that
the consignees were to pay "five-eighths of a penny sterling per
pound, with five per cent. primage and average accustomed." In
Humfrey v. Dale, E. B. & E. 1004, affirming on appeal the same
case in 7 E. & B. 266, the extreme proposition was sustained that
where brokers purchased without disclosing the name of their
principal, proof of usage was admissible to show that the brokers
were liable to be looked to as principals. CocEBURN, 0. J., delivered the opinion.
In Bobinson v. United States, 13 Wallace 363, proof of usage
was admitted to show that under a contract to deliver barley, it
was to be delivered in sacks and not in bulk.
It was said that parties who contract on a subject-matter concerning which known usages prevail, by implication incorporate
them into their agreements if nothing is said to the contrary.
And this is a rule now too well settled to admit of dispute.
That primage and average were to be added to the freight, the
plaintiff was entitled to show a general usage in support of, and
as there are now two currencies established by Acts of Congress
and in use here, viz., gold and paper-money (C7hrysler v. Renois,
43 N. Y. 213; Kellogg v. Sweeney, 46 N. Y. 293,) the plaintiff
might show a usage that such contracts as he made with defendant
were so made in the gold-currency and not the paper. This being
so, there was no ground of equitable cognisance, and the complaint must be dismissed: Mann v. Fairehild,2 Keys 111; Heywood v. City of Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 540; Bradley v. Aldrich, 40
N. Y. 510.
'The defendant had an absolute right to a trial by jury and
did not waive it, but objected in time; viz., at the opening of the
case, afterwards renewing Iiis objection when plaintiff rested, and
again when the case was closed: Greason v. Ketellas, 17 N. Y. 498.
Judgment for defendant, dismissing the complaint for the want
of equitable jurisdiction.

